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Abstract
Language pervades social life. It is a primary means by which we gain access to the contents
of others' minds and establish shared understanding of the reality. Meanwhile, there is
an enormous amount of linguistic diversity among human populations. Depending on what
counts as a language, there are 3,000 to 10,000 living languages in the world, although a
quarter of the world’s languages have fewer than 1,000 speakers and half have fewer than
10,000 (Crystal, 1997). Not surprisingly, a key question in culture and psychology research
concerns the role of language in cultural processes. The present chapter focuses on two
issues that have received by far the greatest amount of research attention from cultural
researchers. First, how does language and human cultures co-evolve? Second, what are
the non-linguistic cognitive effects of using a certain language? Does speaking different
languages orient individuals to see and experience the external reality differently? The scope
of the present chapter does not permit a comprehensive review of all pertinent research; only
a selected sample of studies will be used to illustrate the main ideas in the present chapter.
This article is available in Online Readings in Psychology and Culture: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol4/iss2/2
Civilization began the first time an angry person cast a word instead of a rock.  
Sigmund Freud (1900, p. 165) 
Language pervades social life. It is a primary means by which we gain access to the 
contents of others' minds and establish shared understanding of the reality. Meanwhile, 
there is an enormous amount of linguistic diversity among human populations. Depending 
on what counts as a language, there are 3,000 to 10,000 living languages in the world, 
although a quarter of the world’s languages have fewer than 1,000 speakers and half have 
fewer than 10,000 (Crystal, 1997). Not surprisingly, a key question in culture and 
psychology research concerns the role of language in cultural processes. The present 
chapter focuses on two issues that have received by far the greatest amount of research 
attention from cultural researchers. First, how does language and human cultures co-
evolve? Second, what are the non-linguistic cognitive effects of using a certain language? 
Does speaking different languages orient individuals to see and experience the external 
reality differently? The scope of the present chapter does not permit a comprehensive 
review of all pertinent research; only a selected sample of studies will be used to illustrate 
the main ideas in the present chapter. 
Co-Evolution of Language and Culture? 
Throughout the history of hominid evolution, the brain, language, and culture have 
coevolved in close interaction with each other. Figure 1 illustrates the co-evolution of the 
brain, language, and culture. Spoken languages emerged about 350,000 years ago, 
preceded by several remarkable anatomical changes, including a large expansion of the 
size of the hominid brain, descent of the larynx, redesign of the supralaryngeal vocal tract, 
and evolution of specialized auditory and memory capabilities for processing speech 
(Levelt, 1989). Some recent findings also show that the evolution of human language is 
built on a biological foundation. The Broca’s area in the brain controls speech in humans, 
and a recent study (Petrides, Cadoret, & Mackey, 2005) discovered a distinct brain region 
in macaque monkeys that controls jaw movements. This region is located in the same 
region and has the same anatomical characteristics as Broca’s area and is connected with 
the brain area that is involved in the retrieval of information from memory. When this area 
in the monkey was electrically stimulated, the subject displayed jaw movement sequences.  
Before the emergence of spoken languages, hominids had relied primarily on hand 
gestures and vocal signals to communicate their thoughts to others. Spoken languages 
have several advantages over hand gestures. A spoken language works at a distance and 
in the dark, and does not interfere with other motor activities (e.g., hunting). In addition, 
because humans can produce an infinite number of sound patterns, relative to hand 
gestures and primitive vocal signals, a vocal language can support a larger number of 
different words. As such, speech is much more efficient in conveying meanings than are 
hand gestures and vocal signals (Krauss & Chiu, 1998). 
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 Figure 1. Co-evolution of biology, language and culture
 
 
The development of human language is also an adaptive response to the need to 
represent non-immediate events symbolically. The use of language as a means to 
represent non-immediate events is a unique human accomplishment (Hockett & 
1968). Based on their pragmatic functions, speech acts can be classified into five major
types: directives (e.g., orders, demands, requests), expressives (e.g., 
representatives (use of linguistic symbols to represent an immediate, non
displaced event), commissives (commitments, promises), and declaratives (e.g., 
fired; Austin, 1962; Searle, 1975). Other mammals use directives and expressives 
extensively, but the use of representatives, commissives, and declaratives is 
predominantly human (D’Andrade, 2002). Additionally, while other mammals typically use 
representatives to refer to immediate events only, humans often use representatives to 
refer to something that is not immediately present (e.g., 
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The importance of spoken languages in the evolution of culture cannot be 
overstated. As Bruner (1990) said, “Our culturally adapted way of life depends upon 
shared meanings and shared concepts and depends as well upon shared modes of 
discourse for negotiating differences in meaning and interpretation” (pp. 12–13). An 
important design feature of human languages is their arbitrariness: the same expression 
can mean different things, and the same object can be referred to differently. Furthermore, 
because there are indefinite ways sounds can be mapped onto meanings in a spoken 
language, people can describe the same event in different terms, and therefore assign 
different meanings to it. Individuals in a collective may share many experiences, but 
different individuals may describe these experiences differently. As these individuals 
interact, they will collaborate to find a mutually acceptable expression to describe their 
experiences. Shared meanings arise and are encoded in the resulting shared expressions 
(Lau, Chiu, & Lee, 2001). Through this meaning negotiation process, a culture or shared 
reality emerges. Because different human groups may agree upon different ways of 
referring to their group experiences, different variants of symbolic cultures gradually evolve 
in different populations. 
Linguistic Influences on Non-Linguistic Thoughts 
There are several ways language use can affect non-linguistic thought processes.  
Processing the language’s characteristic form 
Using a language requires repeated engagements of the perceptual and cognitive 
operations involved in processing the language’s characteristic form. For example, written 
languages differ in writing directions. English is written from left-to-right and English 
speakers are accustomed to scanning reading materials from left-to-right. In contrast, 
Hebrew is written from right-to-left. Israelis, who are used to read from right-to-left, have 
developed the habit to scan reading materials from right-to-left. When asked to perform the 
visual test illustrated in Figure 2, speakers of English tend to perform better on trial 1 than 
on trial 2, and Hebrew speakers tend to perform better on trial 2 than on trial 1 (Braine, 
1968).  
Chinese characters are written from left to right, but are sometimes read from top-to-
bottom as well. Not surprisingly, Chinese speakers can perform vertical scanning just as 
efficiently as they do horizontal scanning (Freeman, 1980). Americans are not used to 
read from top-to-bottom, because English texts are seldom written in that direction. Thus, 
Americans often find it harder to perform vertical scanning than horizontal scanning. More 
important, Chinese American children who do not have any experience with written 
Chinese perform more poorly in vertical scanning than in horizontal scanning, just as the 
American adults do (Hoosain, 1986), suggesting that experiences with reading Chinese 
texts is responsible for the cultural differences in the preferred direction of visual scanning.  
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Figure 2. A visual scanning task 
Shared experiences 
People use language to encode experiences. As a result, some aspects of the shared 
experiences in the culture are associated with the language itself. Thus, using a certain 
language will automatically call out its associated shared experiences. Several studies 
have illustrated how language calls out its associated cultural knowledge and influence 
behaviors (Earle, 1969; Ross, Xun, & Wilson, 2002; Sussman & Rosenfeld, 1982; 
Trafimow, Silverman, Fan, & Law, 1997). In one study (Earle, 1969), Chinese–English 
bilinguals in Hong Kong responded to a measure of dogmatism either in its original English 
version or in a Chinese translation of it. Previous research has reported higher levels of 
dogmatism among Asian students than British and American students (Meade & 
Whittaker, 1967). Earle found that her bilingual participants scored higher on dogmatism 
when they answered the Chinese questionnaire than when they completed the English 
one. To explain these results, Earle (1969) proposed that the English language culture is 
relatively less authoritarian than the Chinese language culture. English-Chinese bilinguals, 
who have learned their two languages in distinct settings and live in a bicultural 
environment, can maintain two somewhat different belief systems. Moreover, these 
bilingual individuals may activate one or the other belief system depending on the 
language being used in the current situation.  
Subsequent studies have provided further evidence for the idea that language can 
temporarily push bilinguals’ responses in one or the other direction. For example, 
Trafimow et al. (1997) found that Chinese–English bilinguals in Hong Kong used more 
demographic and social categories to characterize themselves when they described 
themselves in Chinese and more references to personal beliefs, attitudes, and qualities 
when they described themselves in English. In another study (Ross et al., 2002), China-
born students studying in Canada responded to a set of questionnaires written in either 
Chinese or English. An English-speaking Canadian group was included as a control group. 
Compared to the bilingual Chinese group, who responded to the English version of the 
questionnaires and the Canadians, the Chinese bilingual participants who responded to 
the Chinese version of the questionnaires reported more collectivist qualities of the self, 
lower self-esteem, a more balanced (vs. predominately positive) mood, a more balanced 
(vs. predominately favorable) view of the self, and higher endorsement of Chinese values.  
Language priming also affects nonverbal behaviors. Compared to North Americans, 
Venezuelans interact at closer distance than do the Japanese (Engebretson & Fullmer, 
1970; Watson, 1970). In one study (Sussman & Rosenfeld, 1982), Venezuelans and 
Japanese had conversations with another member of their culture on their most favorite 
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sports and hobbies. Some were induced to hold the conversation in their native language, 
and some in English. When the conservation was conducted in their respective native 
language, Japanese sat farther away from their interaction partner than did Venezuelans. 
However, when the conversation was conducted in English, Japanese shortened their 
conversation distance (relative to their peers conversing in the Japanese language), and 
Venezuelans increased the distance (relative to their peers conversing in the Venezuelan 
language). 
Because of the learned associations between language and culture, individuals who 
are motivated to assert or defend their cultural identity often intentionally or inadvertently 
exaggerate the speech characteristics (e.g., accent) of the dominant language used in 
their cultural group (e.g., Tong, Hong, Lee, & Chiu, 1999). A recent set of studies 
(Ogunnaike, Dunham, & Banaji, 2010) measured individuals’ implicit attitudes toward their 
ethnic culture when they were tested in the language of their ethnic culture, and found that 
individuals automatically associate positive attitudes with their ethnic culture when they 
were tested in the language of their ethnic culture. For example, French-Arabic bilinguals 
in Morocco showed more favorable implicit attitudes toward Morocco when they were 
tested in Arabic as compared with French. Likewise, Hispanic Americans showed more 
implicit pro-Spanish attitudes when tested in Spanish compared with English.  
Social relationships 
The grammar of a language may draw its users’ attention to certain aspects of social 
relationships and hence reinforce a certain conception of interpersonal relations that is 
shared in the culture. A series of studies carried out by Emi Kashima (Kashima & 
Kashima, 1998; Kashima & Kashima, 2003) provide a good illustration of this point. In 
these studies, Kashima and her colleagues examined how the linguistic system of pronoun 
may encode conceptions of the social self in the culture. The use of pronouns sustains 
attention on the referent of the pronoun, bringing the person out from the conversational 
background. For example, the use of first-person pronoun (I in English) draws attention to 
the speaker, and maximally distinguishes the speaker’s self from the conversational 
context. Likewise, the use of second-person pronoun (you in English) maximally 
distinguishes the addressee(s) from the conversational context. In some languages (e.g., 
English), the use of both first- and second-person pronouns is grammatically obligatory. In 
other languages (e.g., Spanish), the subject pronoun can be dropped because the referent 
can be recovered from the verb inflections. There are some languages (e.g., Chinese) in 
which the subject pronoun can be dropped even though there is neither verb inflection nor 
the subject–verb agreement rule. The obligatory use of subject pronoun is suggestive of 
whether the self and the addressee must be made salient in the conversational context, 
and the omission of either one or both first- and second-person pronouns deemphasizes 
the salience of their corresponding referent(s). 
Not surprisingly, a cultural-linguistic group’s emphasis on individualism is correlated 
with the grammatical intolerance for pronoun drop in the group’s dominant language. In a 
country that privileges individualism, its dominant language has higher intolerance for 
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pronoun drop. In an individualist country, its dominant language tends not to allow 
dropping the first- and second-person pronouns that sustain attention on the individual 
actors. 
Facilitation of shared thought processes 
The availability of grammatical markers for a certain thought process in a language can 
facilitate the same thought process among speakers of the language. For example, Puerto 
Rican (PR) Spanish and Turkish have specific verb forms for marking false-belief states 
explicitly. PR Spanish uses creer to denote that the speaker is neutral on whether the 
grammatical subject in the sentence holds a true belief or not, and adds a reflexive clitic to 
the verb phrase (creer-se) to denote that the speaker is sure that the grammatical subject 
holds a false belief. English and Brazilian (BR) Portuguese have no such specific forms. In 
one study, Shatz, Diesendruck, Martinez-Beck, and Akar (2003) compared the 
performance on a false-belief understanding task of PR Spanish- and Turkish-speaking 
preschoolers with their English- and BR Portuguese-speaking counterparts. In this study, 
one experimenter showed the preschooler a crayon box and a blue box in the presence of 
a second experimenter. Then, the second experimenter left the room to get some paper. 
After the second experimenter had left, the first experimenter opened both boxes, 
remarked that the crayon box was empty and the blue box contained crayons, and asked 
the preschooler, “Where does [Experimenter 2] think the crayons are?” Note that in the 
question, the verb think provides an explicit marker of the false belief in the two languages 
with formal markers for false beliefs. If having explicit grammatical markers for false beliefs 
in one’s own language improves understanding of false-belief states, PR Spanish 
speakers and Turkish speakers should do better than BR Portuguese and English 
speakers on the comprehension task. As expected, the Turkish- and PR Spanish-speaking 
children outperformed the two other groups in the comprehension test, indicating that 
having explicit markers of false beliefs in a language can promote comprehension of false-
belief states. 
Relatedly, the availability of economical referring expressions in a language can 
affect memories of social experiences. Each language has its distinct vocabulary that 
would allow a certain type of experiences to be expressed easily, rapidly, briefly and 
uniformly. In this study, Hoffman, Lau, and Johnson (1986) show that the use of such 
economical expression to encode a state of affairs may influence the way the language 
user processes information pertinent to that state of affairs. These investigators identified 
English- and Chinese-language personality adjectives that have no economical equivalent 
in the other language. For example, there is no single English term equivalent in meaning 
to the Chinese personality adjective shì gu, which depicts a person who, among other 
things, is worldly, experienced, socially skillful, and somewhat reserved. Likewise, there is 
no single Chinese adjective for someone who has artistic skills and interests, an “artistic” 
cognitive style and temperament, and leads a “bohemian” lifestyle. The appropriate 
English term is artistic (or, better, the artistic type). 
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The study involved three groups of participants: a group of English monolinguals, a 
group of Chinese-English bilinguals who processed the information in English, and a group 
of Chinese-English bilinguals who processed the information in Chinese. Participants read 
a set of concrete behavioral descriptions of four fictitious characters, either in English or in 
Chinese. Two of the characters exemplified personality schemas with economical labels in 
Chinese but not in English (the Chinese-specific adjectives) and the other two characters 
exemplified personality schemas with economical labels in English but not in Chinese (the 
English-specific adjectives). 
When the behavioral descriptions of the two characters exemplifying the personality 
types with English-specific labels were processed in English, participants’ subsequent 
memory of the original description was biased in the direction of the labels: They tended to 
infer label-congruent attributes not found in the original descriptions. Similar memory bias 
was also observed when the behavioral descriptions of the two characters exemplifying 
the personality types with Chinese-specific labels were processed in Chinese. 
Experiencing the world 
Finally, languages may also affect how individuals experience the world. According to the 
linguistic relativity hypothesis (Whorf, 1956), which is illustrated in Figure 3, individuals in 
an ethnolinguistic group are led by their shared language experiences to acquire shared, 
habitual ways of thinking, which influence cognition in a general way. This hypothesis is 
premised on the following assumptions about perceptual experiences, language, and 
culture. First, some perceptual experiences (e.g., experiences of time and colors) are 
presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions. These experiences need to be organized 
by the human minds. Second, the formal structure of each language embodies a 
distinctive internal logic. Third, the distinctive internal logic of a language constrains its 
speakers’ thought processes, creating marked differences in cognitions between speakers 
of different languages (Whorf, 1956). If the ways in which a language is organized stand in 
isomorphic relation to how its associated culture is organized, culture, like language, would 
also possess an internal logic, and be highly patterned, systematic, and distinctive. If so, a 
language a person speaks would determine how the person encodes his or her 
experiences.  
The possibility that language can influence encoding or categorization of 
experiences has received a lot of empirical attention. Many studies that tested the 
linguistic relativity hypothesis have focused on the effect of language on color perceptions 
and memory, because although people in different cultures have more or less equivalent 
experiences with colors, variations in color vocabulary can be readily found in natural 
languages. For example, American English has 11 basic color terms, and Dugum Dani (a 
stone age tribe from Irian Jaya) has only two achromatic terms for color. It should be 
emphasized that in color perception, the perceptual order imposed by properties of the 
visual system limits the range of language’s effects on color categorization. For example, 
no language has color categories that include two color spaces (e.g., yellow and blue) and 
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Figure 3. The linguistic relativity hypothesis
 
 
exclude the connecting color space (e.g., green, Davidoff, 2001). Nonetheless, within the  
constraints imposed by the visual system and the structure of the color space, languages 
partition the color space differently (Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000). If it can be 
shown that the different ways different languages partition the color space can affect th
users’ perceptions and memory of color experiences, this finding will provide strong 
support for the linguistic relativity hypothesis.
Evidence from the early studies was not in favor of the linguistic relativity hypothesis. 
For example, an early study showed that although colors are represented very differently 
in English and Dugum Dani, speakers of the two languages organize their memor
representations of the colors in similar ways (Heider & Olivier, 1972). 
However, recent studies (Kay & Kempton, 1984; Roberson, Davis, & Davidoff, 2000) 
show that when the speaker of a language 
describe colors, the speaker’s subsequent memory of the colors may be influenced by the 
color terms used in the description. In a cross
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Study 1) presented three color chips at a time to native speakers of English and speakers 
of Tarahumara (a Uto-Aztecan language of northern Mexico), and had them judge the 
perceptual distance among the stimuli. Unlike English, Tarahumara lacks the lexical 
distinction between the color categories of “green” and “blue.” When the participants’ 
judgments were compared to the physical distance of the stimuli, the English-speaking 
participants, but not Tarahumara-speaking ones, systematically overestimated the 
distance between two colors when the green–blue color boundary passed between them. 
This finding suggests that the basic color terms in a language can influence color 
perception. 
Kay and Kempton (1984) believe that the English-speaking participants might have 
used a naming strategy when they were performing the judgment task. For instance, when 
presented with two colors that fell in the green category and one color that fell in the blue 
category, they might have labeled the two greener colors “green” and the bluer color 
“blue.” This strategy could have led the participants to overestimate the perceptual 
distance between the two “green” colors and the “blue” color. However, the Tarahumara-
speaking participants could not use this naming strategy because their language lacks the 
lexical distinction between the color categories of “green” and “blue.” Thus, they did not 
overestimate the dissimilarity between the bluer color and the two greener colors. 
To test this idea, in a second study, Kay and Kempton (1984, Study 2) made 
English-speaking participants use both verbal labels (“blue” and  “green”) to encode the 
same color. First, the participants were shown the target color with a greener color. Under 
this circumstance, they named the target color as the “bluer” color. Next, they saw the 
target color with a bluer color. Now, they encoded the target color as the “greener” color. 
Following this, the participants evaluated the perceptual distances between the three 
colors. The effects of linguistic encoding cancelled out each other, because the same color 
had been encoded both as the greener and the bluer color. As a result, English-speaking 
participants no longer displayed the perceptual distortion observed previously. Instead, 
their judgments corresponded closely to the stimuli’s physical distances and agreed with 
the Tarahumara speakers’ judgments. 
Roberson et al. (2000) reported similar findings in a conceptual replication of the Kay 
and Kempton (1984) experiments. The participants in the Roberson et al.’s experiments 
were English and Berinmo speakers. Like Tarahumara, Berinmo makes no lexical 
distinction between “blue” and “green” colors. However, English lacks linguistic labels that 
refer to “nol” and “wor” colors in Berinmo. When asked to judge the perceptual similarity 
between pairs of colors, English speakers judged two colors across the green–blue 
boundary as more dissimilar to the two colors within the green or blue category. However, 
they did not show such categorical perception for colors across the nol–wor boundary. The 
reverse was true for Berinmo speakers. Similar results were obtained among both English 
speakers and Berinmo speakers in color category learning and color memory.  
Furthermore, as mentioned people generally perform less well when the task 
requires discrimination of a target color from a distractor color within the same color 
category than when the task requires discrimination of the target color and a distractor 
color from a different color category. Nonetheless, within-category discrimination improves 
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 when the target color is a good exemplar of the color category and the distractor a poor 
exemplar, compared to the situation in which the target color is a poor exemplar of the 
category and the distractor a better exemplar (Hanley & Roberson, 2011). This evidence 
provides further support for the effect language categorization on color perception, 
suggesting that discriminating colors from different color categories is like discriminating a 
good exemplar of a category from a distractor color that is at boundary of the color 
category.  
More important, in a subsequent study, when a verbal interference
introduced to prevent subvocal encoding of the stimuli, the effect of categorical perception 
of colors on color memory disappeared (Roberson & Davidoff, 2000). These findings 
indicate that a lexical term must be used to encode an event for i
language user’s memory representation of the event.
Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience have shed new light on how language 
might affect color perception. According to dual system model of language and culture 
(Regier, Kay, & Khetarpal, 2007; Roberson, in press), the left hemisphere of the brain has
 
Figure 4. A dual system model of language and cognition
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areas that specialize in language processing, allowing the perceiver to see the world 
through the distorted lens of language, whereas the right hemisphere is associated with 
non-linguistic tasks and affords a language-free perception of the world. Moreover, the 
perceiver can switch between the two systems effortlessly. According to this model, the 
language encoding effect would occur only when the stimuli are presented in the right 
visual field of the perceiver, which will be processed by the left brain (see Figure 4). 
Gilbert and colleagues (Gilbert, Regier, Kay, & Ivry, 2006) tested this hypothesis in the 
visual search task. On each trial of the task, participants were asked to fixate their eyes on 
a cross in the center of the computer screen. Then a colored oddball would appear among 
an identically colored array of distractors either in the right or left visual field. The 
participants were required to detect the presence of the oddball as quickly as possible. 
Linguistic encoding effect was measured by manipulating the target and background of 
colors, holding constant the amount of physical separation between the two colors. In 
some trials, both the target and background colors came from the same color category 
(e.g., blue). In other trials, they came from different color categories (e.g., the target color 
was blue and the background color was green).  
Linguistic encoding effect occurred if participants performed better when the target 
and background colors came from different color categories than if they came from the 
same category. Significant linguistic encoding effect was found only when the target 
oddball was presented in the right visual field. Parallel evidence was reported in a 
subsequent cross-language study that examined linguistic encoding effects in English and 
the Korean language (Roberson. Pak, & Hanley, 2008). 
Conclusions 
Language, cognition, and culture evolved together in close interactions. Figure 5 
summarizes the intricate relationships between culture, language and the mind. Evolution 
of the brain supports the development of language, which as a communication tool 
facilitates the creation, perpetuation, and renegotiation of shared meanings and cultural 
consensus. Language is a multi-faceted concept; it is an integrated system of sounds, 
symbols, and meanings. It consists of various features, including writing conventions, 
grammar, vocabulary, and metaphors.  
Language and cultural processes are intimately connected, as illustrated in the 
research examples described above. For example, language provides a shared tool for 
encoding and sharing collective experiences, contains linguistic features that draw its 
speakers’ attention to culturally valued aspects of the physical and social ecology, and has 
grammatical markers that facilitate thought processes and economical and rich 
expressions to categorize and make sense of our sensory experiences. There is also 
emerging evidence that some areas of the left hemisphere of the human brain specialize in 
language-mediated processing of human experiences, although the same neuroscience 
findings also suggest that not all human experiences are filtered through the tainted lenses 
of languages as some radical versions of the linguistic relativity hypothesis has assumed. 
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Figure 5. Language effects on culturally shared cognitions
 
The close connections between language and culturally shared cognitions allow 
language to call out its learned associations automatically and to serve as a marker of 
one’s cultural identity. Thus, to fully understand culture as a biologically enabled and 
collectively constructed process, psychologists need to understand the intricate 
interactions between the brain, culture, language and the mind.
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